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This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the e¢ciency implications of privatizing natural
monopolies which are vertically related to potential competitive industries (network utilities). Based
on the incomplete contracts and asymmetric information paradigm, I develop a model that analyzes
the relative advantages of di¤erent institutional arrangements – alternative ownership and market
structures in the industry – in terms of their allocative (static) and productive (dynamic) e¢ciencies.
The main policy conclusion of this paper is that both ownership and the existence of conglomerates
in network industries matter. Among other conclusions, this paper provides an economic rationale
for mixed economies when the network is public and both vertical separation and full concentration
of the industry when the natural monopoly is regulated under private ownership.
Keywords: Network utilities, Natural monopolies, Privatization, Public ownership, Regulation
by incentives, Vertical integration / separation, Mixed economies, Incomplete contracts, Asymmetric
Information.
1. Introduction
A large number of public enterprises were privatized in developed and developing countries in the 80’s
and 90’s. From both the empirical and theoretical points of view, it is clear that privatizing public …rms
in competitive sectors may result in welfare improvements. This outcome is not clear, however, when
public …rms have monopolistic power. While some studies found empirical support for privatizing public
enterprises with monopolistic power (e.g., Galal, et. al, 1994; Levy and Spiller, 1996; and Newbery,
1997), from a theoretical point of view, however, the best choice in terms of ownership and control is
still ambiguous; in particular, when considering network utilities.
This paper compares the welfare implications of six di¤erent institutional arrangements which arise
from the analysis of di¤erent market structures – liberalization, vertical separation, and full concentra-
tion – and two forms of ownership – privatization and nationalization – in an industry with naturally
monopolistic characteristics. It may be useful to begin with some de…nitions.
¤I thank Kaushik Basu, David Easley, Robert Masson, Eduardo Zambrano, and seminar participants at Ilades-
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yILADES/Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado. E-mail: saavedra@uahurtado.cl Web page:
www.ilades.cl/economiaLiberalization is the market structure in which any …rm is free to enter the competitive market
Vertical separation is the market structure characterized by the legal impossibility for the monopoly
to produce in any related market. I use in this paper divestiture as equivalent of vertical separation.
Full concentration is the market structure in which an integrated monopoly obtains the legal right
to be the only …rm in the industry
Nationalization corresponds to a situation in which the monopoly is state owned
Privatization occurs when the monopoly is privately owned and regulated by the government
Institutional arrangement is the industry design resulting from one speci…c form of ownership of
the monopoly and one of the speci…c market structures de…ned above.
In studying the welfare implications of alternatives institutional structures, I identify welfare with
the net social surplus.
The model suggests that the two forms of ownership and the three forms of market structure markedly
contrast in their implications on the allocatively and productively e¢ciency of the industry. Hence, it
provides theoretical support to i) vertical separation of competitive and monopolistic activities under
private property, ii) privatization of a legal monopoly in the industry, and iii) mixed economies in the
competitive market under a state owned monopoly.
For example, under privatization – regulation under private ownership of the monopoly – a vertically
separated industry is socially preferred to both a liberalized and a fully concentrated industry when
information asymmetries between the government and the monopolist are large enough, so that they
induce important distortionary rents to the monopolist in the competitive industry.
On the other hand, mixed economies – a state owned monopoly producing in competitive markets of
the industry – is preferred to any other alternative when both information asymmetries are large enough,
so that privatization becomes too costly in terms of distortionary rents to the monopolist, and there are
adequate incentives for public …rms to produce e¢ciently.1
What is new in this paper is that it studies various institutional set-ups within the same common
framework, and …nds an economic rationale for imposing constraints on competition in a network in-
dustry with naturally monopolistic activities. This result, nonetheless, does not rely on noncompetitive
assumptions concerning the monopoly’s behavior.
The literature on applied contract theory tells us that ownership is irrelevant and liberalization
Pareto dominates any other market structure when fully complete contingent contracts can be written
at the moment of choosing the best institutional arrangement for the network utility. Williamson (1985)
argues that under no transaction costs a full contingent contract can be written by the government
such that a public …rm can mimic a private one. Moreover, a public …rm may outperform private …rms
when externalities are present. Then, under complete contracting a public …rm can be at least as good
as a private …rm, from the social welfare point of view. On the other hand, Sappington and Stiglitz
(1987) show the converse in the so-called Fundamental Theorem of Privatization. Whenever possible,
the government may write down a full contingent contract specifying the whole life of a …rm after being
privatized. Then, from the society’s perspective a private …rm can be at least as good as a public …rm.2
However, when unforeseen contingencies prevent the government from writing complete contingent
1This paper considers a normative view of privatization. Its conclusions, regarding the relative advantages of public
ownership, may not hold when corruption and rent seeking activities are non-negligible.
2See Proposition 1 in Shapiro and Willig (1990) or Bös (1994) for a formal proof of this Theorem. In our speci…c model,
Proposition 3.1 also shows the irrelevance of ownership under full contracting. Moreover, under the same assumption,
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 prove that liberalization Pareto dominates the other two institutional arrangements.
2contracts, we no longer have conclusive results regarding whether private or public monopolies are more
e¢cient.3 For example, Shapiro and Willig (1990) suggest that privatization means a change in the
structure of incentives of the …rm such that private ownership reduces the incentives of the government’s
o¢cials to pursue their own agenda but it is more allocatively ine¢cient than public ownership. La¤ont
and Tirole (1991) show that a private monopoly is productively e¢cient but con‡icts in the agenda of
the principals – a regulator and shareholders – induces lower powered incentive schemes. Schmidt (1990)
and (1996) – whose framework I follow closely – shows a trade o¤ between a private monopoly which may
produce at lower costs and a public monopoly which always produces Pareto optimal allocations. Finally,
La¤ont (1995) suggests that there exists a trade o¤ between the lower costs of low powered incentive
schemes under privatization and the expectations of rent appropriation under public ownership.
Many other issues need to be taken into account, however, when analyzing privatization in devel-
oping countries.4 For example, an adequate regulation by incentives requires, minimally, well prepared
regulators, unambiguous regulatory frameworks, and enforceability of the law. Indeed, none of those
characteristics are adequately present in developing countries. Moreover, there are factors a¤ecting the
allocative e¢ciency of private monopolies as long as they are allowed to carry out potential competitive
activities. Even though the latter e¤ect is not only a characteristic in developing countries,5 its adverse
implications are exacerbated by the incompetence of regulators, ambiguities in the regulatory framework,
and the lack of institutions able to enforce contracts. Such characteristics justify using the incomplete
contracting approach in this paper.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature on privatization using optimal mechanism
design is to introduce a network utility industry into the analysis. Most of the literature has assumed a
monopoly without any relation to other potentially competitive markets. Such a setting is far from reality,
because natural monopolies are tipically vertically related with competitive activities. For example, the
telecommunications sector usually has a natural monopoly in local telephone services, which provide
access facilities to wireless, long distance telephone carriers, TV Cable, and Internet providers; the
electricity sector has natural monopolistic characteristics in transmission and distribution activities but
generation and supply segments of the industry are potentially competitive; pipelines may be designed
to be open carriers to distributors; track activity in railroads is a natural monopoly but passenger
and freight markets are potentially competitive. Therefore, a consistent framework to that observed in
practice provides an economic rationale for some commonly observed institutional arrangements, such as
mixed economies when the monopoly is public or vertical separation when it is regulated under private
ownership.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model of two vertically related markets, one of which
has natural monopoly characteristics and the other, which may be designed as a competitive market, is
presented in the next section. I assume in section 3 that the government chooses to liberalize the industry,
3Shapiro and Willig (1990), Schmidt (1990), and La¤ont and Tirole (1991), certainly are the …rst papers in taking the
incomplete contracting approach to theoretically justify that property matters. Schmidt (1996) provides a brief survey
of such literature. La¤ont (1995), on the other hand, is the …rst paper in introducing a political economy theory of
privatization using the incomplete contracting approach.
4La¤ont (1994 a) stresses the relationship between incentives and privatization in developing countries. Bhaskar (1993)
and Bitran and Saavedra (1993) present an extended discussion on this regard using, respectively, the Indian and the
Chilean experience. Basañes, Saavedra, and Soto (1999) provides a number of speci…c cases on post contractual con‡icts
arising in the newly privatized Chilean electricity sector.
5Regarding the British experience in privatizing utilities and the problems associated to natural monopolies operating
in competitive activities, see Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994).
3either under nationalization or privatization of the monopoly, so that the pros and cons of privatizing a
natural integrated monopoly under asymmetric information are extended to a network setup. I analyze
the other feasible institutional arrangements in section 4. One such option arises from the possibility
of designing a vertically separated monopoly, whose competitive market industry is operated by …rms
unrelated to the monopoly. The other feasible institutional arrangement is to concentrate all the activities
in a unique fully integrated monopoly. Comparisons among di¤erent institutional arrangements are
presented in this section. A simple example that highlights our main …ndings is shown in section 5.
Finally, section 6 concludes the analysis and discusses the scope for further research using the model.
2. The Model
There are two vertically related goods. A natural monopoly upstream produces y units of an intermediate
good using a constant return to scale technology. This good is only used as input in the downstream
industry. This monopoly may also produce xm units of the downstream good using a decreasing return
to scale technology. Let us assume, without lost of generality, that both y and xm are produced by an
integrated monopoly.
Technologies used by the monopoly are not common knowledge, however. The owner has better
information, for example, about the e¢ciency of the technological processes inside the …rm. Accordingly,
total costs of the monopoly, unknown to outsiders, are k(µ)¢y+C(xm;µ), where µ 2 fµ;µg is an adverse
selection parameter which summarizes the e¢ciency level of the …rm. Nonetheless, the support of µ is
common knowledge.6
Let us assume the existence of important sunk costs that justify the assumption of there being one
…rm (monopoly) producing the upstream good. These costs, however, are less than the social value of
the …nal good, x, for any x > 0. They become irrelevant, however, when analyzing di¤erences on payo¤s
of the alternative institutional arrangements. Thus, I take it out of the parties’ payo¤s.
Assume that C(xm;µ) is strictly increasing and convex in xm, for all xm. Convexity of C(xm;µ) is
consistent with a strictly increasing and concave production function when the monopoly produces the
downstream good. This, in turn, implies that the derived demand for the input from the monopoly itself
is a strictly increasing and convex function of xm. That is, y = '(xm;µ), such that '0 > 0 and '" > 0.
For simplicity, let us write it as '(xm). In addition, assume that k(µ) < k(µ), C(xm;µ) < C(xm;µ), and
C0(xm;µ) < C0(xm;µ), for all xm. The last condition is the Spence-Mirrlees condition (single crossing
condition).7
An important assumption in the model is that only the owner of the monopoly observes the adverse
selection parameter, µ. Hence, under privatization the government is unable to observe µ and must
elicit the true information through solving a mechanism design problem. Assume that the government
requires to hire a manager to run the upstream state owned …rm, but without further loss of generality,
assume that the owner runs the monopoly by herself under privatization.8
6It is important to mention that we are using the common network assumption (both technologies, upstream and
downstream, have the same adverse selection parameter). Despite being a strong assumption, it is absolutely necessary to
apply optimal mechanism design in this paper, as noted by La¤ont and Tirole (1993) chapter 5. Otherwise, under network
expansion (di¤erent adverse selection parameters), the regulator has less instruments than unknowns to elicit true-telling.
7Since µ is a discrete variable, derivative symbols represent partial derivatives with respect to the other argument of
the function.
8It is without further loss of generality. Alternatively, we may assume that the asymmetric information between the
private monopolist and her manager is less important than that between the government and the monopolist, then all our
4Let us assume that before µ is realized by the owner of the monopoly, the manager of this …rm (a
public employee or the private owner) may invest e¤orts e in cost reducing activities. The higher the
value of e, the more likely the …rm will be an e¢cient type. Let q(e) be the probability of obtaining µ.
In order to obtain interior solutions, assume that, for all e ¸ 0, q(e) is strictly increasing and concave,
lim
e!0
qe(e) = 1, lim
e!1 qe(e) = 0, and 0 < q(e) < 1.
There is a potential competitive fringe downstream. If the fringe enters, it produces xf units of the
downstream good, using a linear-technology. The fringe’s marginal cost is constant, c, and common
knowledge.9 The monopoly charges an access price a for each unit of its intermediate good sold to the
fringe and this access price may be regulated under privatization. As usual in practice, in order to avoid
market foreclosure, I assume that the monopoly cannot refuse to sell any required inputs by the fringe
(serfdom).
Therefore, total production of the input is equal to its total derived demand, that is y = '(xm)+xf.
Then, from now on I mention ['(xm) + xf] instead of y, so I denote k(µ)¢['(xm) + xf] as the upstream
cost function of producing ['(xm) + xf] units of the intermediate good.
I assume that the downstream activity produces a social bene…t of v(xm + xf). Let v(¢) be strictly
increasing and concave, satisfying Inada Conditions, and v(0) = 0. Assume income e¤ects are negligible.
Thus v0(xm+xf) = P(xm+xf) corresponds to the inverse demand function for the …nal good. Moreover,
market equilibrium condition implies zero pro…t to the fringe (P(xm + xf) = c + a).
The structure of these related markets allows us to analyze the e¢ciency advantages and pitfalls of
six feasible institutional arrangements (three under nationalization and three under privatization). They
are:
² Liberalization – integrated monopoly and competition downstream (nic & pic),
² Vertical separation – divestiture – and competition downstream (ndc & pdc),
² Full concentration – integrated monopoly with no competition at all – (nnc & pnc).10
In the case of regulation under private ownership, the government charges a price z to the winner
of a competitive bidding process. In equilibrium, this price drives to the new owner of the monopoly
to her expected reservation utility (by simplicity, assume this utility to be equal to zero). On the other
hand, if the …rm is nationalized, the government pays to a manager a salary w. Similarly as before, in
equilibrium w is such that the manager is driven to her reservation utility, which is equal to zero.
Let us considerer the case where the regulator determines cost reimbursement rules under privatiza-
tion. The government gets the revenue of the monopoly activity and pays to the monopolist a transfer
T(µ) in period 2. Transfers are determined by the government through a menu of contracts set in pe-
riod 3/2, before production takes place and after the owner of the monopoly realizes µ. Since a direct
mechanism requires the menu of contracts to be contingent on observable variables, transfers are …xed
qualitative results hold. My assumption is consistent, therefore, with normalizing the agency problem inside the private
monopoly to be nonexistent.
9This assumption is without further lost of generality. For our purpose, it is enough to assume that the fringe and the
monopoly have di¤erent technologies when producing the downstream good.
10These acronyms work as follow: the …rst letter represents ownership (p: privatization and n: nationalization); second
and third letters represent monopoly’s activities and the nature of downstream competition (ic: integrated monopoly and
competition downstream, i.e. liberalization; dc: divestiture of the monopoly and competition downstream, i.e. vertical
separation; and nc: no competition in any market, i.e. full concentration).
5contingent to the monopoly’s production, y and xm. Then, each contract is a pair transfer-production
fT(xm(µ);xf(µ));(xm(µ);xf(µ))g, for each µ 2 fµ;µg, which induces truth-telling.
Figure 2.1, below, indicates the timing of actions in this model.
Figure 2.1
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All players are risk neutral and there is no discounting. Table N± 1 presents player’s payo¤s for each
institutional arrangement (by de…nition, each competitive …rm in the fringe obtains zero pro…ts), which
are realized in period 2.
Table N± 1
Privatization
Government (V) Monopolist (U)
pic : v(xm + xf) + z ¡ T(µ) ¡ c ¢ xf ¡z + T(µ) ¡ k(µ) ¢ ['(xm) + xf]
¡C(xm;µ) ¡ e
pdc : v(xf) + z ¡ T(µ) ¡ c ¢ xf ¡z + T(µ) ¡ k(µ) ¢ xf ¡ e
pnc : v(xm) + z ¡ T(µ) ¡z + T(µ) ¡ k(µ) ¢ '(xm) ¡ C(xm;µ) ¡ e
Nationalization
Government (V) Manager (U)
nic : v(xm + xf) ¡ w ¡ k(µ) ¢ ['(xm) + xf] ¡ C(xm;µ) ¡ c ¢ xf w ¡ e
ndc : v(xf) ¡ w ¡ k(µ) ¢ xf ¡ c ¢ xf w ¡ e
nnc : v(xm) ¡ w ¡ k(µ) ¢ '(xm) ¡ C(xm;µ) w ¡ e
3. Liberalization of the Downstream Market
3.1. First Best Allocations
In this section I assume that the contract signed by the parties (government–manager or government–
monopolist) is complete, in the sense that it speci…es relevant variables contingent to the states of nature.
6Proposition 3.1 characterizes the …rst best production and allocations. As expected, it is irrelevant
whether the monopoly is public or private. Under complete contracting the access price is not an issue
either, because any deviation from the optimal price would be severely punished.
Proposition 3.1. Under full contracting there is a unique vector of allocations, access price, and a
level of cost reducing activities (x¤
m(µ);x¤
f(µ);a¤ic(µ);e¤ic), for each µ 2 fµ;µg, which is optimal from
the society’s point of view. Furthermore, either the manager of the public monopoly or the owner of the
private monopoly gets zero ex-post payments. Thus, the next …ve equations fully characterize the …rst
best:
P(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) = k(µ) ¢ '0(x¤ic
m (µ)) + C0(x¤ic
m (µ);µ) (3.1)
P(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) = k(µ) + c (3.2)
a¤ic(µ) = k(µ) (3.3)
qe(e¤ic) ¢ [W¤ic(µ) ¡ W¤ic(µ)] = 1 (3.4)
U = 0 (3.5)
where W¤ic(µ) corresponds to the ex-post net social bene…t of producing x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ) units of the
…nal good, for each µ 2 fµ;µg; that is:
W¤ic(µ) ´ v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢
£
'(x¤ic




m (µ);µ) ¡ c ¢ x¤ic
f (µ)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In period 0, the government’s expected payo¤ under full contracting is equal to:




¢ W¤ic(µ) ¡ e¤ic (3.6)
Long term contracts in general are not feasible, however. Since the technological parameter is only
realized in period 1, the time zero contract cannot specify contingent e¤orts, production, wages, or
transfers. In addition, the government is unable to commit not to expropriate rents from cost reducing
activities. Therefore, optimal allocation of resources would not be achieved. Let us …rst analyze a state
owned monopoly operating in both markets.
3.2. Nationalization
In practice, governments o¤er very low-powered incentives schemes to public employees, even to CEO’s
of public …rms. The literature has explained this regularity in two ways. First, governmental agencies
have several less informed principals (such as unions, consumers, producers, ministries, politicians, etc.),
all of them with their own agendas. It turns out that one of the actions taken for those principals is to
limit the power of the government in designing payment schemes of public employees.11
11See, among others, Vickers and Yarrow (1987) and Martimort (1996) regarding the structure of incentives in gov-
ernment. Dixit, Grossmann, and Helpman (1997) show this result as an endogenous outcome of there being too many
principals. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Gal-Or (1991) study this common agency problem in more general settings.
7A second explanation comes from the fact that under some situations the government would be better
o¤ choosing non contingent contracts. For example, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) argue that some
high-powered incentives for some dimensions of performance may divert the attention of the agent from
other more important, but less easily measured, aspects of performance.12
In order to capture this problem of low-powered incentive schemes in government’s contracting and
to avoid a more cumbersome model, let us assume that the government cannot o¤er an incentive scheme
to the public manager; i.e., her salary w is …xed at the time zero contract.
The more important result under public monopoly is that allocative e¢ciency is attained; the gov-

























anic(µ) = a¤ic(µ) = k(µ)
The disadvantage of the public ownership is that the manager does not invest in cost reducing
activities at all. The reason is because her payo¤ function is strictly decreasing in those activities (w is
…xed in the contract), then her best response is always to set:
enic = 0
Since the government is worse o¤ giving up rents to the manager, its dominating strategy is to set
wnic = 0 in order to drive the manager to her reservation utility.
The best interpretation of the previous proposition is to think enic = 0 as a normalized minimum
level of e¤orts such that the manager will not be …red for bad performance. Such a feature is typical in
public employees, but can this feature be generalized to a public monopoly’s manager? Let say yes, at
least compared to private …rms’ managers, because public managers do not cope with discipline market
mechanisms. For instance, the possibility of hostile take-over and bankruptcy are not an issue in public
…rms. The former because the manager might be …red for political agreements rather than relative bad
performance of her …rm; the latter because the government always goes in the rescue of its troubled
…rms.13
Therefore, the government’s expected payo¤ under public ownership at time 0 is:
V nic = q(0) ¢ W¤ic(µ) + [1 ¡ q(0)] ¢ W¤ic(µ) (3.8)
3.3. Privatization
Under regulation of the private monopoly, the owner of this …rm realizes µ in period 1. This technological
parameter is unknown to the government, however. Then the government must design a revelation
12Other explanations to incomplete contracting suitable to the model presented in this paper may be found in Spier
(1992), Anderlini and Felli (1994), and Bernheim and Whinston (1998). It is important to mention that most of the
papers in the literature consider private parties. They are not focused on a benevolent government as the principal of the
relationship. See Dixit (1996) for an application of the transaction cost economics to political economy issues.
13Majumdar (1998) provides empirical support to the implications of soft budget constraint on slacks in state owned
…rms.
8mechanism to elicit the true value of µ. It is standard that the asymmetric information on µ allows
e¢cient type …rms to obtain rents. It turns, therefore, that the monopolist has incentives to invest in
cost reducing activities. Proposition 3.2, below, characterizes the second best production and transfers.
The result is well known in the literature.14 It is characterized by “no-distortion-and-informational-
rents-on-the-top” and “underproduction-and-no-rents-at-the-bottom”. Therefore, the private monopoly
is allocative ine¢cient because it produces less than the …rst best level.15
Let b e be the government’s equilibrium belief regarding the action taken by the monopolist in cost
reducing activities. Let us suppose, then, that the government believes the costs are low with probability
b q ´ q(b e). Informational rents of the e¢cient monopolist are equal to RU(b e) in the upstream market and







'(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e)
¤
RD(b e) ´ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ)
The government’s problem in period 3/2 can be expressed as the problem of a central planner choosing ©
xm(µ;b e);xf(µ;b e);xm(µ;b e);xf(µ;b e)
ª
.16 That is,
Max fb q ¢ [v(xm(µ;b e) + xf(µ;b e)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ ('(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e))
¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ c ¢ xf(µ;b e) ¡ U]
+ (1 ¡ b q) ¢ [v(xm(µ;b e) + xf(µ;b e)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ ('(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e))
¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ c ¢ xf(µ;b e) ¡ U]
¡ b eg
subject to (nomenclature is standard):
IR(µ): U ¸ 0
IR(µ): U ¸ 0










j (µ) and x
pic
j (µ), for j = fm;fg, be the solution to the government’s problem.








RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¶
(3.9)
14My model is closer to Baron and Myerson’s (1982) than La¤ont and Tirole’s (1986; 1993, Chapter 1), in the sense
that costs are not observed by the principal. Good surveys on optimal mechanism design applied to regulation of natural
monopolies may be found in Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, and Tirole (1988) and La¤ont (1994 b). An interesting application
to privatization issues is Pint (1992).
15The government dislikes giving up rents to the …rm. The model captures such a fact because it assumes, without loss
of generality, that monopolist’s pro…ts are not incorporated into the government’s objective function.
16Roughly speaking, the government does not directly regulate the competitive market. It regulates production in the
monopolistic upstream market and may regulate the access price charged by the monopoly to the fringe. Since the fringe
is a residual supplier of x and I follow the convention that the government collects monopoly’s revenue (P(¢)xm+axf), the
solution to the planner’s problem is equivalent to that resulting from a decentralized decision problem with …rms choosing































Proof. See Appendix A.
Distortion when the monopoly is ine¢cient is the cost of private ownership in this model. Underpro-
duction also a¤ects the access price that the monopolist charges to the fringe for using its intermediate
good, usually a network facility. As expected, the optimal access price represents the shadow costs to the
monopolist for providing its input to competitors.17 The access price charged by the e¢cient monopoly
is similar to that resulting under complete contracting. Otherwise, the competitive market would not
be cleared.
apic(µ) = a¤ic(µ) = k(µ)
However, when the monopoly is ine¢cient, this price is greater than the …rst best access price.
apic(µ) = k(µ) +
b q






> a¤ic(µ) = k(µ)
The latter inequality is because RU
xf(b e) > 0 by the single crossing property and monotonicity on
C(xm;µ) and '(xm;µ). The …rst term in apic(µ) is the direct marginal cost to the monopoly of providing
access to the fringe. The second term is the monopoly’s opportunity cost in terms of lower informational
rents.
Since I have assumed cost reimbursement rules, the government makes a transfer to the owner of the
monopoly that covers opportunity costs. Let Tpic(µ) be such transfers, for µ 2 fµ;µg. Notice that the gov-
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The above discussion tells us that the …rm is granted total freedom in choosing the access price.
However, the revelation principle ensures the …rm will choose the second best level, apic(µ), for µ 2 fµ;µg.
Such a result is a direct consequence of the common network assumption in the model, as noted by
La¤ont and Tirole (1993), chapter 5. Under this assumption, the monopoly cannot charge an excessive
access price to the fringe in order to deter entry in the downstream market. Doing so, the monopoly
would increase its market share in the downstream industry with a higher xm, but it would indicate to
17This is a well known result – E¢cient Component-Pricing Rule (ECPR) – due to Baumol (1983) and Willig (1979).
Such a formula becomes much more complicated when allowing for imperfect substitutes, variable coe¢cient technology,
and bypass possibilities in the downstream market, as noted by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996), La¤ont and Tirole
(1993), chapters 5 and 6, and La¤ont and Tirole (1994).
10the government a predatory practice. The government knows that a higher access price means higher
marginal costs for xm too, which is inconsistent with raising xm.18
Both, the monopolist and the regulator know what will happen after the …rm undertakes investments
in cost reducing activities. The next proposition tells us that the monopolist invests more than the public
manager, but less than the optimal e¤ic. Then, the private monopoly is more productively e¢cient than
the public monopoly, because production in the former is more likely to be at the lowest cost.
Proposition 3.3. The monopolist invests epic(b e), which is her best response to the government’s belief
that she invests b e, and 0 < epic(b e) < e¤ic. Furthermore, there exists a unique rational expectations
equilibrium epic(b e) = b e determined by:
qe(epic(b e)) ¢
£
RU(epic(b e)) + RD(epic(b e))
¤
= 1 (3.12)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Let epic ´ epic(b e), the unique rational expectation equilibrium solving the monopolist’s problem
above. In period zero, the government drives the monopolist to her expected reservation utility, that we
have assumed equal to zero. Therefore,





It turns out that the government’s expected payo¤ is equal to:




¢ Wpic(µ) ¡ epic (3.13)
where the ex-post social surplus at µ is below W¤ic(µ) and de…ned by:
Wpic(µ) ´ v(xpic
m (µ) + x
pic
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In this model, public monopolies are allocatively e¢cient but productively ine¢cient, i.e. they don’t
optimally invest in cost reducing activities. The latter is so because the government, as the principal,
is unable to credibly commit not to expropriate all rents generated by investments in cost reducing
activities. Hence, the manager does not invest at all. On the contrary, a private monopoly is allocative
ine¢cient in the high cost type but more productive e¢cient than a public monopoly (not yet fully
e¢cient because the private owner under invests as compared to the …rst best level). Again, government’s
lack of commitment plays a crucial role in both inducing the agent (either private monopolist or public
manager) to under invest and, consequently, distorting production in period 2.
18Discriminatory practices using the access price are ruled out in the model, which seems to be contrary to what we
observe in practice. That may be the result of two non exclusionary explanations. Common network assumption may lack
reality and network expansion would be better suitable to analyze the access price problem. Secondly, the model does
not fully capture the fact that contracts enforceability in developing countries may be so poor that, even with a common
network, the dominant …rm may discriminate and predate the market (see Saavedra, 1999).
11Another interesting point highlighted by this model is that a benevolent government does not nec-
essarily imply public monopolies are socially preferred to private monopolies. Hence, we do not need
to assume private agendas at the top of the government (other than the social welfare maximization)
to say that depending upon structural parameters of the economy, privatization may be preferred to
nationalization, as the next result establishes.













Remark 1. The left-hand side on (3.14) represents the pros of privatization. It corresponds to the net
expected bene…t of producing at low costs. The cons of privatization are shown in the right-hand side
of (3.14). Its …rst component corresponds to the expected loss caused by the allocative ine¢ciency of
the private monopoly. Its second component measures the direct loss to the society in terms of costs
reducing activities.
Inequality (3.14) is useful as policy advice because it tells the policy maker how speci…c industry and
country characteristics a¤ect relative advantages of the privatization process. For example, the lower
powered the incentive schemes and more bureaucratized and politically based the making of decisions
in public …rms, the deeper the dynamic ine¢ciency of state-owned monopolies. On the contrary, the
more informational, transactional, and institutional constraints in the country, the more ine¢cient allo-
cation of resources under regulation of the private monopoly. Therefore, before initiating privatization
processes, policy makers have to create conditions in order to reduce informational constraints, improve
enforceability, and reduce ambiguities of the law, and so on.
4. The Two Extreme Cases
Most of the discussion when the private sector is allowed to participate in natural integrated monopolies
is whether or not to vertically separate the monopolistic activity from those potential competitive indus-
tries. If divested, the monopolist would be impeded to expand its market power to those other markets.
I provide a rational scope for this position. Another alternative is to fully integrate all the activities into
the monopoly. This alternative is widely attacked because of its allocative and distributive e¤ects. I
show in this section, however, that full concentration may provide the highest incentives to reduce costs
in the long run.19
4.1. Vertical Separation of the Monopoly and Competition Downstream
Let us now consider the case where the monopoly is vertically separated and cannot produce the down-
stream good. This institutional arrangement was chosen in the USA telecommunication sector when
AT&T was separated from its local network operators in 1984. Following the experience of the British
privatization process, several developing countries, such as Argentina, have organized the electricity
sector in this fashion too.
19Notice that the institutional arrangements which consider the two extreme institutional arrangements are special cases
of those in section 3. Then, proofs are in general omitted.
12In most developing countries people think that this is the only way to accept privatization of network
utilities, otherwise the monopoly will use its market power against competitors in potential competitive
markets in order to deter entry, discriminate, or predate, among other noncompetitive practices. In this
regard, our objective in this section is to provide a rational justi…cation for a vertical separation of a
network utility, as was the AT&T case.
² First Best Allocations For each µ 2 fµ;µg, the …rst best allocations are fully characterized by
equations (4.1) to (4.4).
P(x¤dc
f (µ)) = k(µ) + c (4.1)






U = 0 (4.4)
where
W¤dc(µ) ´ v(x¤dc
f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ x¤dc
f (µ) ¡ c ¢ x¤dc
f (µ)
First of all, notice that equations (4.1) implies x¤dc
f (µ) = '(x¤ic
m (µ))+x¤ic
f (µ) – equivalently y¤dc(µ) =
y¤ic(µ) – for each µ 2 fµ;µg. This result is not general, however. It comes from the fringe’s constant
marginal cost assumption in the downstream industry.
Let V ¤dc be the expected value of the fully informed planner’s problem in this case. Lemma 4.1 tells
us that in a world where contingent contracts are feasible, not only ownership does not matter but also
the common belief against integrated monopolies is incorrect. There are no economic reasons, from the
e¢ciency perspective, to blame against natural monopolies operating in competitive related industries.
Lemma 4.1. Under full contracting and competition in the downstream market society is better o¤ with
an integrated monopoly than with a vertically separated monopoly.
The proof is simple. The planner’s problem under vertical separation at time zero has an additional
constraint as compared with the planner’s problem under liberalization. Since this constraint binds
(notice our assumption about interior solutions), then V ¤ic(µ) > V ¤dc(µ). Otherwise, a contradiction to
the government’s revealed preferences arises. This completes the proof
Figure 4.1 provides an explanation to Lemma 4.1, and to the previous discussion.
This result doesn’t necessarily hold, however, when unforeseen contingencies impede to write fully
complete contracts.
² Nationalization Consider a vertically separated state owned monopoly. As before, production is
optimal, there is no investment in cost reducing activities, and the government establishes transfers equal
to the marginal cost of producing y (which is equal to xf) units of the upstream good. Since I have
assumed the manager’s opportunity cost is zero, she receives no salary (wndc = 0) in equilibrium, as
already shown.
Government’s expected payo¤ at date zero is:
V ndc = q(0) ¢ W¤dc(µ) + [1 ¡ q(0)] ¢ W¤dc(µ) (4.5)
Comparing (3.7) and (4.5) – that is V nic and V ndc – yields the next result.
13Figure 4.1: Welfare Costs of Vertical Separation under Complete Contracting
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Result 2 An integrated public monopoly with a mixed competitive market downstream – liberalization
– is socially preferred to a separated monopoly with a private fringe of …rms operating in the
downstream industry.
Remark 2. This result is important for the optimal timing of the deregulatory process. That is, it is
never optimal to forbid public monopolies to participate in potential competitive markets, even when
the government is planning to privatize the monopolistic activity.20
This model provides a rationale scope for mixed markets. This result, in a context of a network utility
with a downstream competitive market, is new in this literature. Most of the papers have justi…ed mixed
oligopolies, i.e. private and public …rms operating in an oligopolistic competition.21 Result 2 of this
paper, however, tells us that mixed markets are socially desirable in competitive markets vertically
connected to a state-owned natural monopoly, so that we do not need to abandon the pro-competition
paradigm in order to justify this institutional design.
² Privatization Under privatization, the owner of the private monopoly realizes µ in period 1. The
government designs a mechanism to elicit truth-telling, but it may give up some rents to the e¢cient
type …rm. This informational rent, however, is smaller than the rent captured by the e¢cient …rm under
liberalization. Since those rents induce ine¢cient allocation of resources, the society would be better o¤
under vertical separation than under integration and competition downstream.
20The experience shows that, before initiating privatization processes, public …rms are impeded to operate in emerging
markets. This policy is used by governments in order to credibly signal its commitment to not revise privatizations. Such
a consideration is not an issue in this paper, however, because revision of privatizations are ruled-out from the model.
21Some traditional papers in this emerging literature are Beato and Mas-Colell (1982), Cremer, Pestieau, and Thisse
(1987), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), and De Fraja (1991). About partial privatization in mixed oligopolies, see Bös
(1994) and Matsumura (1998).






Similarly as before, the second best allocations are fully characterized by equations (4.6) to (4.8).
U = 0 and U = B(b e) (4.6)
x
pdc











f (µ)) = k(µ) + c +
b q
1 ¡ b q
¢ [B0(b e)]
and the last term of the right hand side is strictly positive because of B0(b e) ´
@B(b e)
@xf > 0.
The second-best access prices in equilibrium are equal to marginal costs of providing access to the
network (input). Therefore, when the monopoly is e¢cient:
apdc(µ) = a¤dc(µ)
Since (4.1) implies y¤dc(µ) = y¤ic(µ), then
apdc(µ) = apic(µ)
too. That is, the access price charged by an e¢cient monopoly to potential competitors is the same,
whatever the institutional arrangements chosen by the government.
On the other hand, the access prices charged by an ine¢cient monopoly is greater than the …rst best
access price:
apdc(µ) = k(µ) +
b q
1 ¡ b q
¢ [B0(b e)]
> a¤dc(µ) = k(µ)
Moreover, the access price under vertical separation of the private monopoly is smaller than that of
the ine¢cient type integrated monopoly operating in the competitive industry, apdc(µ) < apic(µ). The
reason is that vertical separation induces smaller informational rents to the monopolist, which in turn
shrinks the opportunity cost of providing access to the input.
Since the monopoly is not participating in the competitive industry, the government has to …x
contingent (truth-telling) access prices in order to avoid abuse of monopoly power against competitors,
i.e. the government cannot grant the monopoly with any freedom in choosing those prices under vertical
separation. Accordingly, the government collects those charges (we are using cost reimbursement rules),
so that transfers are:
Tpdc(µ) = k(µ) ¢ x
pdc
f (µ) + [B(b e)]
Tpdc(µ) = k(µ) ¢ x
pdc
f (µ)
15As under liberalization, (second-best) optimal cost reducing activities are in the interior of the in-
terval [0;e¤dc]. Since expected informational rents under vertical separation are smaller than under
liberalization, it is immediate that cost reducing activities under vertical separation are also smaller.22
epdc < epic
Hence, the adverse e¤ect of vertical separation on the society’s welfare is that divestiture reduces the
probability to the …rm to be e¢cient.
Continuing backward, the government sells the upstream monopoly at:





Therefore, the government’s expected payo¤ at time zero is equal to:








f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ x
pdc
f (µ) ¡ c ¢ x
pdc
f (µ)
² Analysis We are interested in the trade o¤ resulting when the decision is whether or not to allow
integrated monopolies to participate in competitive industries. In other words, the question is whether
to design a liberalized or a vertically separated industry.23
When a monopoly is e¢cient in producing, it obtains more rents if operating in both markets than
if it is impeded to produce the …nal good. Then, it has more incentives to invest in cost reducing
activities under integration than under vertical separation. On the contrary, a vertically separated
natural monopoly is more allocative e¢cient than an integrated monopoly because its expected rents
are smaller in the former case, what implies the monopoly reduces underproduction on the ine¢cient
type state of nature.
As analyzed before, ine¢ciencies come from the fact that the government cannot credible commit to
not expropriate some of the monopolist’s rents caused by cost reducing activities.
I summarize this discussion on the next result:
Result 3 Vertical separation of the private natural monopoly is socially preferred to grant it total
freedom to operate vertically related markets – liberalization – if and only if:
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RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¤
induces epdc < epic.
23Under vertical separation, state owned monopolies are allocatively e¢cient but productively ine¢cient; the contrary
happens to private monopolies. Since we have already assessed this trade o¤ under more general assumptions (Result 1),
it is omitted here.
16Remark 3. The left-hand side on (4.10) represents the pros of liberalizing the competitive market. It
corresponds to the net expected bene…t of producing at lower costs by the integrated monopoly. The
bene…ts of the vertical separation are represented by the right-hand side of (4.10). The …rst component
corresponds to the expected gains caused by reducing the allocative ine¢ciency of the private monopoly.
The second component on the right hind side of (4.10) measures the direct bene…t to the society in terms
of fewer resources spent in cost reducing activities.
Whether or not inequality (4.10) holds depends in speci…c calibrations of the structure of the industry
(demand and cost functions) and on the intensity in which incentives push cost reducing activities. The
left-hand side and the last term of the right-hand side of this inequality are strictly positive because
epic > epdc (see footnote 23) and W¤ic(µ) > W¤dc(µ), whereas the …rst term of the right-hand side
of (4.10) could be positive if welfare distortions at the ine¢cient type of …rms are not too high under
vertical separation that under liberalization (see section 5 for a speci…c parametric example).
4.2. Monopoly Concentrates All the Activities
State-owned monopolies concentrating all the activities of an industry were the characteristic around the
world until a few years ago. After privatization, this situation has remained somewhere. Governments in
these countries have granted private monopolies with legal entry barriers to competitors in non-natural
monopoly segments of the industry. These legal rigidities have been imposed in industries experiencing
fast technological advances in the last time, making competition feasible in markets controlled by a
“legal” monopoly. Since the government’s response to new market conditions is slow and the monopoly
may use its pro…ts to maintain the status quo, this situation may remain longer than expected.
Economists typically blame “legal” monopolies. We ought to say that competition is socially preferred
to monopoly whenever possible. The model presented in this paper, however, establishes that this
conclusion depends on country and/or industry speci…c characteristics. The fact that the cost parameter
(µ) is common to any production of the monopoly might imply that full concentration of vertically related
activities were desirable to the society, as we would see in a world with unforeseen contingencies. It is
perfectly feasible, therefore, to observe the situation in which a rational and benevolent government with
no long-term commitments decides about the ownership of a monopoly before introducing competition
in potentially competitive segments of the industry. That is, for instance, when privatization precedes
liberalization of the industry.
² First Best Allocations Full concentration in the industry is also a particular case of liberalization,
in which there does not exist a fringe of competitive …rms that operate in the downstream market. For
each µ 2 fµ;µg, …rst-best allocations are fully characterized by equations (4.11) to (4.13).
P(x¤nc
m (µ)) = k(µ) ¢ '0(x¤nc







U = 0 (4.13)
where,
W¤nc(µ) ´ v(x¤nc
m (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ '(x¤nc
m (µ)) ¡ C(x¤nc
m (µ);µ)
17Figure 4.2: Welfare Costs of Full Concentration under Complete Contracting
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Let V ¤nc be the expected value of the fully informed planner’s problem in this case. Likewise vertical
separation, in a world where contingent contracts are feasible the best market design requires to allow
both an integrated monopoly and competitors participating in those potentially competitive markets.
Lemma 4.2. Under full contracting, the society is better o¤ if the government deregulates competitive
markets and does not impose any barrier to enter.
The proof is similar to Lemma 4.1. By government’s revealed preferences, V ¤ic(µ) > V ¤nc(µ). This
completes the proof
Regarding the comparison between vertical separation and full concentration, it is interesting to
mention that none of these institutional arrangements dominates the other. Both present ex-ante ine¢-
cient allocation of resources because the mix of technologies to produce the …nal good is not optimal, as
compared to that under liberalization.24 The nature of the ex-ante allocative ine¢ciency is di¤erent in
both alternatives, however. Thus, we cannot ensure what institutional arrangement makes the society
better o¤.
Figure 4.2 provides an explanation to Lemma 4.2, and to the previous discussion.
Conclusions under incomplete contracts hold in the case of a state owned monopoly, but not in the
case of regulation under a private fully concentrated monopoly.
24Notice that ex-ante ine¢ciencies concern comparison among alternative institutional arrangements and not within
them. Within each institutional arrangement, there is not (ex-post) allocative nor (ex-post) productive ine¢ciency because
we are comparing complete contracting situations.
18² Nationalization In this subsection I show that there is no rationale behind the policy of maintaining
legal entry barriers in state owned industries.
Remember that the government does not have a credible commitment to not expropriate ex-post rents
resulting from cost reducing activities undertaken by the manager. This intertemporal inconsistency in
the government’s behavior is anticipated by the manager, who underinvests as compared to the full
contracting case (ennc = 0). The government, then, drives the manager to her reservation utility in
period zero, that is wnnc = 0. Then, the government’s expected payo¤ is therefore:
V nnc = q(0) ¢ W¤nc(µ) + [1 ¡ q(0)] ¢ W¤nc(µ) (4.14)
Comparing (3.7), (4.5), and (4.14) – that is V nic, V ndc, and V nnc – yields the next result.
Result 4 An integrated public monopoly with competition downstream is socially preferred to an inte-
grated state owned …rm operating as a monopoly in all markets.
Results 2 and 4 are conclusive. If nationalization is preferred to privatization, then it is always better
to allow the public monopoly to operate in all related markets. Similarly, private competitors should also
be allowed to operate in potentially competitive segments of the industry. Therefore, contrary to the
current literature, liberalization is always welcome in potentially competitive markets when maintaining
a state owned monopoly.
² Privatization Assume for a while that the monopoly is very e¢cient to produce the …nal good – its
cost’s structure is close to that of the fringe – but rents of the e¢cient type push cost reducing activities
in such way that productive e¢ciency out weights allocative ine¢ciencies of the full concentration. Under
this context, then, liberalization is not socially desirable. This subsection attempts to show how feasible
is this situation.
Let the informational rents be
£
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and the last term of the right-hand side is strictly positive.
19Truth-telling transfers to the monopolist are:
Tpnc(µ) = k(µ) ¢ '(xpnc
m (µ)) + C(xpnc
m (µ);µ) +
£
MU(b e) + MD(b e)
¤
Tpnc(µ) = k(µ) ¢ '(xpnc
m (µ)) + C(xpnc
m (µ);µ)
Higher expected rents provides incentives to the owner of the monopoly to undertake cost reducing
activities, epnc 2 [0;e¤nc]. Unfortunately, without further information on demand and cost functions,
and in the informational incentives in cost reducing activities, we cannot say anything regarding the
relative size of epnc, epic, and epdc.
In period zero, the government sells the whole integrated monopoly at:
zpnc = q(epnc) ¢
£
MU(b e) + MD(b e)
¤
¡ epnc
Therefore, the government’s expected payo¤ at the moment of the privatization is equal to:
V pnc = q(epnc) ¢ W¤nc(µ) + [1 ¡ q(epnc)] ¢ Wpnc(µ) ¡ epnc (4.18)
where,
Wpnc(µ) ´ v(xpnc
m (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢ '(xpnc
m (µ)) ¡ C(xpnc
m (µ);µ)
² Analysis Once it is recognized that incomplete contracting matters, it is clear that liberalize (dereg-
ulate) potential competitive industries is a dominant strategy of the government only if the monopoly
remains public and operates in both markets (Result 4).
Suppose for a while that for some reason mixed markets (private and public operators) are not
feasible, then a state-owned monopoly concentrating all the activities may be socially preferred to a
vertically separated public monopoly. This is the case in which the ex-ante allocative ine¢ciency in
the former is smaller than that in the latter (see shaded areas in Figure 4.1 above).25 Anyway, Result
2 strongly recommends liberalizing competitive markets when the monopolistic upstream …rm is state
owned.
A stronger conclusion may be driven when considering a private monopoly. The economic literature
has discussed the advantages of deregulating potentially competitive activities at length. Examples are
airlines, trucking, banking, agriculture, some segments in telecommunications, gas, water and electricity,
etc.26 Vickers (1995) assumes that “all clear bene…ts of deregulation may be summarized in a parameter
¯ > 0, which out weights any feasible advantage of concentrating in competitive markets”. Such assump-
tion hides what those deregulatory advantages exactly are. In terms of the model in the present paper,
however, such procedure would impede to see that concentration might be socially preferred because it
would facilitate production at the lowest costs, and all the expected monopoly pro…ts can be captured
by the government when auctioning the …rm.
25Remember that under nationalization both alternatives have the same productive ine¢ciency (none investment in cost
reduction activities at all) and both are (ex-post) equally allocative e¢cient. Then, the only di¤erence between them is
their ex-ante allocative ine¢ciency.
26See Bailey (1995) and Beesley (1997) for further references. The analysis of all the reasons argued by this literature is
out of the scope of this paper, however.
20There is an increasing literature questioning the advantages of deregulation in practice but, to the
best of my knowledge, none argument goes in the direction assessed in this article.27 This conclusion is
summarized in the next result:
Result 5 To concentrate all the activities in a private monopoly is socially preferred to liberalizing the
competitive market if and only if:
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Remark 4. The importance of this result is that it provides us with an economic rationale for maintain-
ing monopolies in potentially competitive markets. Obviously, the outcome depends on speci…c country
and industry characteristics. To see what is the best outcome in practice requires to estimate not only
demands and costs of production, but also the e¤ects of the incentives and informational rents achieved
by the e¢cient type monopolist.
Whether or not inequalities (4.19) and (4.20) hold in practice is an open question. As already
mentioned in the beginning of this subsection, these two inequalities are more likely to occur when
technology of the …nal good between the monopoly and the fringe are more or less similar and cost
reducing activities are very sensitive to expected rents (see a speci…c example in section 5).
5. A Simple Example: Linear Demand and Cost Functions
This section attempts to illustrate the following trade o¤s:
² whether to privatize or not the upstream industry
² after privatization, whether to liberalize the downstream market, vertically separate the industry,
or fully integrate all activities into the monopoly.
First of all, consider a gross consumer surplus as follows:
v(xm + xf) = A ¢ (xm + xf) ¡
1
2
¢ (xm + xf)2
which yields an inverse linear demand function for the downstream good:
P = A ¡ (xm + xf)
27Further references may be found in MacAvoy (1995). As a di¤erence from this model, such literature is calling into
question the capacity of regulators representing the interest of the society, i.e. it abandons the normative view of the
government.
21Let the monopolist’s cost function be:
Upstream : µ ¢
£
± ¢ (xm)2 + xf
¤
Downstream : ® ¢ µ ¢ (xm)2
where µ 2 fµ;µg is the asymmetric information parameter and ®;± are positive, constant numbers.
Then, its total costs are:
µ ¢ (± + ®)
£
(xm)2¤
+ µ ¢ xf
and marginal cost are:
respect to xm : 2 ¢ µ ¢ (® + ±) ¢ xm
respect to xf : µ
On the other hand, the competitive fringe presents constant marginal costs, c.
Assume that q(e) takes the following form:





where ¸ is the probability of being an e¢cient monopolist when no investments in cost reducing activities
are undertaken, ° is a positive parameter, and ¯ > 0 such that q(e) is strictly concave on e.
Despite linear demand and cost functions, the solution – …rst and second-best optimal allocations,
net consumer surpluses, rents, and e¤orts – for each institutional arrangement in general cannot be char-
acterized because of the non-linearity of q(e). Moreover, the system of equations becomes simultaneous
under the three institutional arrangements in both complete contracting and privatization cases. The
system is recursive only under nationalization. Therefore, I use numerical analysis in these simulations.
² Base Simulation and the Privatization-Nationalization Trade o¤ Let us assume that the
Table N± 2 below contains the basic parameters of the industry.
Table N± 2
Parameter : A c ® ± µ µ ¸ ° ¯
Value : 50 1:0 0:20 0:20 0:25 0:10 0:60 60 0:90
This structure implies that a mixed market in the downstream sector yields a better outcome to
society than a private, liberalized industry, as shown in the table below.28
28Table B.1 in Appendix B summarizes the solution of the model using these parameters under liberalization, vertical
integration, and full concentration.
22Table N± 3
First Best (¤ic) Nationalization (nic) Privatization (pic)
µ µ µ µ µ µ
V 1198:78 1198:78 1198:76
e 0.073 0 0.006
q(e) 0.608 0.600 0.601
W 1203.2 1192.2 1203.2 1192.2 1203.2 1192.1
xm 13.8 6.25 13.8 6.25 13.8 5.8
xf 35.2 42.5 35.2 42.5 35.2 42.73
What should happen if the asymmetry of information between the private monopoly and the reg-
ulator increases? There are two implications of varying ¢µ in this model. Unfortunately, both run in
opposite directions. First, the greater di¤erences between µ
0s, the more “distortion-at-the-bottom” (the
allocative ine¢ciency of a private monopoly increases). Secondly, the greater di¤erences between µ
0s,
the more “rents-on-the top”, which induces higher cost reducing activities (private monopoly becomes
more productively e¢cient).
The model with linear demands considered in this section shows that the …rst e¤ect domains for small
di¤erences between the unknown parameters, making a publicly owned monopoly preferred to a private
owned; whereas the second e¤ect becomes much more important for high di¤erences in the unknown
parameters, so that privatization becomes preferred when µ is three or more times higher than µ under
the parameterization showed in Table N± 2 above. Figure 5.1 below illustrates this result.29
² A Case for Vertical Separation One of the main …ndings of this paper is that there exists an
economic rationale for vertical separation under regulation and private ownership of the monopoly. I
illustrate its feasibility by considering a more radical parameterization of the industry. Assume that
parameters of the industry are those in Table N± 4 below:
Table N± 4
Parameter : A c ® ± µ µ ¸ ° ¯
Value : 200 1:0 0:20 0:20 0:50 0:10 0 100 0:90
that is, the competitive fringe of …rms is very e¢cient in producing the …nal good (A increases from 50
to 200), µ is now 400 percent higher than µ, and the probability q(e) is not very responsive to changes
in cost reducing activities (¸ = 0 and ° = 100).
Under this parameterization, vertical separation becomes preferred to liberalization (integration and
competition downstream), as shown in Table N± 5 below (V pdc > V pic).
29Table B.2 in Appendix B contains the outcome of simulations required to construct this …gure.
23Figure 5.1: Trade-o¤ Privatization vs. Nationalization
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Vertical Separation (pdc) Liberalization (pic)
µ µ µ µ
…rst best V 19701.44 19704.43
V 19700:33 19700:02
second e 2.27 2.42
best q(e) .032 .034
W 19780.61 19699.98 19788.17 19699.98
Rents 78.8 0 78.9 0
xm —— —— 13.75 3.74
xf 198.90 196.99 185.15 191.75
Is it in society’s advantage to divest the monopoly as the information between the regulator and the
monopoly becomes more asymmetric (everything else constant)? The answer is ambiguous, as illustrated
in Figure 5.2 below. As the di¤erence between µ and µ becomes higher, the relative advantage of the
liberalization decreases for small ¢µ’s. This trend is, however, reverted for values of µ above 0.5.30
In summary, V pdc > V pic is only true for values of µ between 0.33 and 0.60 (or ¢µ 2 [0:33;0:5]).
Then, for small amounts of asymmetric of information, society is better o¤ liberalizing the industry. Fur-
30Details about …rst-best, nationalization, and full concentration outcomes using this parameterization are in Table B.3,
Appendix B. Table B.4 contains the outcome of simulations required to construct Figure 5.2.
24Figure 5.2: Trade-o¤ Liberalization vs. Vertical Separation
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thermore, this result was found assuming an extremely radical parameterization of the industry. Under
“normal” assumptions on the parameters, vertical separation is not the best institutional arrangement.31
² Changing the Timing of Privatization – Liberalization The literature is not conclusive regard-
ing the optimal timing of the liberalization-privatization process. One example is De Fraja (1994), whose
model characterizes the optimallity of this process using a complete-contract, incomplete-information
model. Since the present paper does not attempt to model the timing of this process, I want to illustrate
this (second best) optimal timing in an incomplete-contract, incomplete-information model. It is easy
to show that for most structural parameters of the industry, society is better o¤ when liberalization
precedes privatization. However, it is more interesting to show that for some speci…c parameterization
of the industry, society is better o¤ under a fully concentrated and privatized industry.
Let us assume that the structure of the industry is adequately summarized by parameters in Table
N± 4. Notice, in particular, that ¢µ = 0:4. However, let us assume now that the competitive fringe of
…rms is poorly e¢cient (c = 14:7) and q(e) is more sensitive to investment in cost reducing activities
(¯ = 0:5) than the case in Table N± 4. Table N± 6, below, shows the results of the new simulation.
This table shows that monopolization of the whole industry is more socially desirable than liberal-
ization under regulation of a private owned monopoly when unforeseen contingencies impede to write
fully contingent contracts.32 This result holds in a wide range of ¯ and °, as showed in Figure 5.3
below. See Table B.6 for details. Notice, however, that this result was found assuming an extremely
radical parameterization of the industry. Therefore, under “normal” assumptions on the parameters,
31Remember that this model does not consider anticompetitive practices of the incumbent.
32See the Table B.5 in Appendix B for further details about …rst-best, public ownership, and vertical separation outcomes
in this context.
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liberalization of the industry seems to be the best institutional arrangement.
Table N± 6
Full Concentration (pnc) Liberalization (pic)
µ µ µ µ
…rst best V 18423.91 18424.82
V 18422:06 18421:99
second e 23.63 19.06
best q(e) .44 .40
W 18518.52 18389.12 18518.52 18389.38
Rents 138.1 0 113.4 0
xm 2500.00 185.78 185.00 168.27
xf —— —— 0.20 13.92
266. Conclusions and Further Research
The main purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the e¢ciency implications of privatization
processes recently carried out in developing countries, in particular Chile. It may be argued that,
in some limited measure, the model is suitable for developed countries too. The point is that some
underlying assumptions in the model better apply to developing countries, such as incomplete contracts
and enforceability problems.33
The experience of recent privatizations in developing countries shows that these processes are not
always successful. Their main shortcomings are basically three. The …rst problem is the existence of
conglomerates in each privatized market – operating in di¤erent segments of the industry – that use their
informational advantages to hamper competition and extract rents from the society. This produces an
ine¢cient allocation of resources. The second shortcoming is the existence of regulatory frameworks that
are both ambiguous and incomplete. Finally, developing countries lack institutions (e.g. regulators and
a judiciary system) able to enforce contracts, improve the law (contracts), and encourage competition
in potentially competitive industries.34
The model used in this article took as given the last two shortcomings, emphasizing the fact that
the monopoly is part of a network utility which provides services to potentially competitive markets.
In this regard, six institutional arrangements were studied and their relative productive and allocative
e¢ciency compared. The main results, in terms of the social welfare perspective, are:
² Result 1 shows that there exists a trade o¤ between privatization and nationalization. A state
owned monopoly is more allocative e¢cient than a private one but – as expected – the latter is
more productively e¢cient.
² If the monopoly remains public, Results 2 and 4 tell us that the society is better o¤ when the
downstream market is liberalized, so that private-run …rms (fringe in the model) may compete with
the public monopoly in this market. Nonetheless, if liberalization is for some reason forbidden the
third-best is not clear, i.e. whether a vertically separated or a fully concentrated public monopoly
makes the society better o¤.
² If the monopoly is regulated under private ownership, then there is no institutional arrangement
that strictly dominates the other two, as shown in Results 3 and 5. This conclusion provides a
rational scope for:
– vertical separation of the naturally monopolistic activities from those potentially competitive.
That is, the greater the asymmetric information, ambiguities in the regulatory framework,
and the less reliable institutions to enforce contracts, the better it is to vertically separate the
monopoly.
– full concentration of the industry. That is, the fewer di¤erences on technologies between
the monopoly and the competitive fringe and the more sensitive cost reducing activities to
33Some economists argue that when assessing issues pertinent to developing countries, it is essential to include corrup-
tion, regulatory capture, and political instability. I disagree, however, because these are not the main characteristics of
several developing countries, like Chile. Consequently, I consider it is valid to use a normative view of privatization when
highlighting other more important problems, such as informational, contracting and enforceability issues in these countries.
34See further details in Saavedra (1999), where the implications of these problems in the Chilean electricity sector are
documented.
27expected rents, the better it is to fully concentrate all activities of the industry in the regulated
monopoly.
I …nally work out an extremely simple example in order to illustrate my results. The simulations
suggest that under normal parameterization of the industry, liberalization of the industry seems to be
socially preferred. The extreme cases were showed only under radical assumptions on the parameters of
the structure of the industry.
There is one important aspect in the regulatory analysis that I expressly left out of the model. If the
government departs from the benevolent paradigm, then state owned …rms become much less preferred
by society as showed by Shapiro and Willig (1990).35 Quantitative implications of incorporating this
aspect into the analysis matter but qualitative implications do not a¤ect our conclusions, however.
Further research on this topic could proceed in several directions. One route is to consider network
expansion with asymmetric marginal costs. That is, the monopoly incurs extra costs when providing
its input to competitors. However, those costs are negligible when providing the intermediate good
itself to produce the …nal good. In such a case, the regulator has more unknown parameters than
instruments. This assumption may help in explaining many noncompetitive practices by the monopoly
when integrated, such as discrimination, market foreclosure, and predation. In turn, it implies that
vertical separation of the private monopoly becomes much more desirable to the society under network
expansion than under common network, everything else constant.
Likewise, it may be useful to take as given a speci…c institutional setup and analyze the e¢ciency
implications of the other two mentioned shortcomings. For example, it may be interesting to study the
consequences of the change from well prepared regulatory agencies to other less prepared. One simple
way is to assume that the set of states of nature is a little bit more complicated than that used here, such
that well prepared regulators know signals of the true state of nature and then compute their posterior
when regulating by incentives. On the contrary, poorly prepared regulators do not know those signals
and, therefore, will compute their priors when designing a true-telling mechanism. Notice however, that
the result that would be attained is trivial because the procedure is exactly the same as that used in
sections 3 and 4 in this paper. Poorly prepared regulators ought to pay more to e¢cient …rms in their
truth-telling mechanism than better prepared regulators. Therefore, it may be easy to show that, for
example, vertical separation becomes more desirable than conglomerates under these circumstances.
Future research should concentrate on the economic implications of ambiguity in the regulatory
framework. Ambiguity is beginning to be studied and one of the more convincing approaches is the new
literature on awareness.36 The problem is that the theoretical aspects of awareness are not fully studied
yet, so that applications to ambiguities in the regulatory framework should remain as a further research
for long time.
Finally, after theoretically assessing the pros and cons of di¤erent industry and ownership structure
designs, it seems to be valuable to empirically validate our conclusions. One possibility is to do case
studies, focusing on the relative advantages of di¤erent institutional arrangements, as seen in this paper.
An alternative way is to build a computable general equilibrium model in order to assess the economic
implications of the privatization process in developing countries.
35This statement is always true in our setting (incomplete contracts and asymmetric information). However, Shapiro
and Willig’s conclusion does not necessarily hold under other contexts.
36Modica and Rustichini (1994) or Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998).
28Appendix A : Proof of Propositions
Proposition 3.1
Let see …rst the last statement. Since government’s payo¤s are inversely related to the public
manager’s (monopolist) payo¤s, then the government optimally chooses w (respectively, the menu of
contracts and z) to drive the agent to her reservation utility, U = 0.
Replacing the individual rationality constraint (IR) of the manager (or the monopolist’s, it does not
change anything) into the government’s objective function, we obtain the government’s problem, which
matches the planner’s problem, in period 3/2:
Max
fxm;xfg
fv(xm + xf) ¡ k(µ) ¢ ['(xm) + xf] ¡ C(xm;µ) ¡ c ¢ xf ¡ eg
By the assumptions on functions v(xm + xf), C(xm;µ), and '(xm), for all (xm;xf), the Hessian of
this problem is negative de…nite, for each µ 2 fµ;µg. Thus, FOC’s are necessary and su¢cient for a
maximum. They are:
vxm(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) = k(µ) ¢ '0(x¤ic
m (µ)) + C0(x¤ic
m (µ);µ)
vxf(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) = k(µ) + c
Since vxm(¢) = vxf(¢) are the inverse demand function of x, P(¢), equations (3.1) and (3.2) are






, for each µ 2 fµ;µg.
The …rst best access price, a¤ic(µ), for each µ 2 fµ;µg, is determined by (3.2) and market clearing
condition in the downstream market. Hence,
a¤ic(µ) = k(µ)
which is the same as (3.3).
Finally, let see what happens with the …rst best cost reducing activities, e¤ic. The true parameter
µ is unknown at the moment of undertaken cost reducing activities (period 1/2). Hence, in the full




q(e) ¢ W¤ic(µ) + [1 ¡ q(e)] ¢ W¤ic(µ) ¡ e
ª
FOC:
qe(e¤ic) ¢ [W¤ic(µ) ¡ W¤ic(µ)] = 1
Single crossing property and assumptions on v(xm + xf), C(xm;µ) and '(xm;µ), for all xm, ensure
a positive square bracket. Moreover, SOC’s are qee(e¤ic)¢[W¤ic(µ)¡W¤ic(µ)] < 0 by strict concavity on
q(e), for all e ¸ 0. Therefore, (3.4) is established. This completes the proof
29Proposition 3.2
Two facts. The individual rationality constraints of the ine¢cient type, IR(µ), and the incentive
compatibility constraint of the e¢cient type, IC(µ), bind. Then,
U = ¡z + T ¡ k(µ) ¢
£
'(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e)
¤
¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ b e = 0
and
U = ¡z + T ¡ k(µ) ¢ ['(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e)] ¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ b e
= ¡ z + T ¡ k(µ) ¢
£
'(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e)
¤
¡ C(xm(µ;b e);µ) ¡ b e
Adding and substracting k(µ) ¢
£
'(xm(µ;b e)) + xf(µ;b e)
¤
+ C(xm(µ;b e);µ), and using U = 0
U = RU(b e) + RD(b e)
Therefore, (3.8) is established.
By the assumptions on v(xm + xf), C(xm;µ), '(xm), and q(e), for all (xm;xf;e), the government’s








>> 0, for j =
fm;fg – then FOC’s are su¢cient for a maximum (let us omit b e as argument of these solutions because
there exists only one b e in equilibrium, as proved in the next proposition).
When the monopoly is e¢cient, FOC’s are:
vxj(xpic
m (µ) + x
pic
f (µ)) = k(µ) ¢
£
³ ¢ '0(xpic
m (µ)) + (1 ¡ ³)
¤
+³ ¢ C0(xpic
m (µ);µ) + (1 ¡ ³) ¢ c
where ³ = f
1 if j=m
0 if j=f
In turns, the e¢cient …rm produces the …rst best levels, x
pic
j (µ) = x¤ic
j (µ), for j = fm;fg, as required
in (3.9).
FOC’s in the ine¢cient type case are:
vxm(xm(µ) + xf(µ)) = k(µ) ¢ '0(xpic
m (µ)) + C0(xpic
m (µ);µ) +
b q
1 ¡ b q
¢ [RD
xm(b e) + RU
xm(b e)]
vxf(xm(µ) + xf(µ)) = k(µ) + c +
b q






@xj , for i = fU;Dg and j = fm;fg, are strictly positive by single crossing
property and monotonicity assumptions on C(xm;µ) and '(xm;µ), for all xm, except RD
xf(b e) = 0.







solving FOC’s for the














. This completes the proof
Proposition 3.3
The owner’s problem when undertaken investments is:
Max
e fEU(e) = q(e) ¢
£
RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¤
+ [1 ¡ q(e)] ¢ 0 ¡ eg
30Since
£
RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¤





RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¤
= 1
Let show that 0 < epic(b e) < e¤ic. Let us use the second best production levels, x
pic
j (µ) and x
pic
j (µ),
for j = fm;fg. By de…nition,
£














m (µ);µ) ¡ C(xpic
m (µ);µ))












m (µ);µ) ¡ C(x¤ic
m (µ);µ)
adding and substracting v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) + c ¢ x¤ic
m (µ), it becomes:
= [v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢
h
'(x¤ic




m (µ);µ) ¡ c ¢ x¤ic
m (µ)]
¡[v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢
h
'(x¤ic




m (µ);µ) ¡ c ¢ x¤ic
m (µ)]
by government’s revealed preferences:
< [v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ) ¡ k(µ) ¢
h
'(x¤ic




m (µ);µ) ¡ c ¢ x¤ic
m (µ)]
¡[v(x¤ic
m (µ) + x¤ic
f (µ)) ¡ k(µ) ¢
h
'(x¤ic










This inequality, (3.4) and (3.11) yield:
qe(epic(b e)) > qe(b e)
then, by strict concavity on q
epic(b e) < b e
On the other hand, since
£
RU(b e) + RD(b e)
¤
> 0, then by (3.11) qe(epic(b e)) > 0. Thus, by monotonicity
on q, epic(b e) > 0.

















+ qe(epic(b e)) ¢
h
RU
b e (b e) + RD














b e (b e) + RD
b e (b e)
i
qee(epic(b e)) ¢ [RU(b e) + RD(b e)]
< 0
by strict concavity on q and negativity on
h
RU
b e (b e) + RD
b e (b e)
i
.
We also know that epic(0) ¸ 0 by de…nition of e¤orts, epic(e¤ic) < e¤ic, and by the Implicit Function
Theorem epic(b e) is decreasing and continuous. Then, the Mean Value Theorem tells us that there exists
a unique …xed point b e satisfying epic(b e)) = b e. This completes the proof.
32Appendix B: Results of Simulations
Table B.1
First Best Allocations
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 6.25 – – 625 250
xf 35.15 42.50 48.90 48.75 – –
W 1203.17 1192.19 1195.61 1188.28 1157.41 1041.67
e 0.0734 0.0016 10.18
q(e) 60.75% 60.02% 86.36%
V 1198.78 1192.68 1131.44
Nationalization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 6.25 — — 625 25
xf 35.15 42.50 48.90 48.75 — —
W 1203.17 1192.19 1195.61 1188.28 1157.41 1041.67
V 1198.78 1192.68 1131.44
Privatization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 5.80 — — 625 29.79
xf 35.15 42.73 48.90 48.52 — —
Rent 8.43 7.28 53.24
W 1203.17 1192.14 1195.61 1188.26 1157.41 957.00
e 0.0064 0.0015 5.15
q(e) 60.08% 60.02% 79.95%
V 1198.76 1192.57 1112.08
33Table B.2
µ=µ=0:1 V pic ¡ V nic RU + RD
0.100 0.0000 0.00
0.125 - 0.0007 2.18
0.150 - 0.0026 3.70
0.175 - 0.0054 5.00
0.200 - 0.0089 6.18
0.225 - 0.0126 7.32
0.250 - 0.0154 8.43
0.275 - 0.0147 9.53





Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 3.75 — — 2500 500
xf 185.15 194.75 198.90 198.50 — —
W 19788.17 19703.94 19780.61 19701.13 18518.52 14285.71
e 3.35 2.28 522.64
q(e) 4.57% 3.27% 85.42%
V 19704.43 19701.44 17378.81
Nationalization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 3.75 — — 2500 500
xf 185.15 194.75 198.90 48.75 — —
W 19788.17 19703.94 19780.61 1188.28 18518.52 14285.71
V 19703.94 1192.68 14285.71
Privatization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 13.75 3.74 — — 2500 88.11
xf 185.15 191.75 198.90 48.52 — —
Rent 78.93 78.79 53.24
W 19788.17 19699.39 19780.61 1188.26 18518.52 12187.52
e 2.42 2.27 240.22
q(e) 3.43% 3.24% 73.11%
V 19700.02 19700.33 16575.75
35Table B.4













Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 185.00 168.30 – – 2500 2272.73
xf 0.20 16.89 185.20 185.19 – –
W 18518.52 18393.90 17149.52 17147.67 18518.52 18392.32
e 21.60 .01 21.95
q 42.14% 0.93% 42.43%
V 18424.82 17147.68 18423.91
Nationalization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 185.00 168.30 — — 2500 2272.73
xf 0.20 16.89 185.20 185.19 — —
W 18518.52 18393.90 17149.52 17147.67 18518.52 18392.32
V 18393.90 1192.68 18392.32
Privatization
Liberalization Vertical Separation Full Concentration
µ µ µ µ µ µ
xm 185.00 168.27 — — 2500 185.78
xf 0.20 13.92 185.20 183.69 — —
Rent 113.39 1.84 138.06
W 18518.52 18389.38 17149.52 17146.54 18518.52 18389.12
e 19.06 0.001 23.63
q(e) 40.01% 0.93% 43.72%
V 18421.99 17146.56 18422.06
36Table B.6
¯=°=100 V pic ¡ V pnc °=¯=0:5 V pic ¡ V pnc
0.05 1.57 1.0 7.12
0.10 - 0.12 12.5 - 0.15
0.15 - 0.58 25 - 0.70
0.20 - 0.70 50 - 0.66
0.25 - 0.69 75 - 0.37
0.30 - 0.61 100 - 0.07
0.35 - 0.50 125 0.21
0.40 - 0.37 150 0.45
0.45 - 0.23 175 0.67
0.50 - 0.07 200 0.87
0.55 0.08 — —
0.60 0.24 — —
0.65 0.41 — —
0.70 0.58 — —
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